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Using a sample of China’s listed entrepreneurial firms, we investigate the relationship
between bank connection, corruption and collateral requirements. We find that when a firm is
connected with banks, collateral requirements are significantly lower. We also find that bank
connection is the channel through which corruption is exercised to benefit those firms with
favoured loan terms. Our analysis further reveals that bank connection and corruption have
jointly improved bank lending efficiency. However, these positive effects become weaker
with government intervention in the form of an economic stimulus package. We argue that in
an emerging market, bank connection facilitates rent seeking and helps entrepreneurial firms
to access bank loans with favoured loan terms, and this relationship-based financing relies on
corruption. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that in an emerging market nonstate sector growth is supported by relationship-based external financing and unconventional
governance methods.

Keywords: Collateral, Bank connection, Corruption, Chinese listed firms
JEL: E51, G32, G34



Gary Tian (email address gtian@uow.edu.au) is corresponding author. Xiaofei Pan’s email address is
xpan@uow.edu.au. The authors thank Collin Xu, William Megginson, Xi Wu, Guanmin Liao and participants
of seminars organized by School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, 12 December
2012, and the Business School, University of International Business and Economics, 13 December 2012, for
valuable comments on an early version of this paper.

1

1. Introduction
Recent literature concerns the relationship between banks and non-financial firms and its
impact on firms’ financing policy. Using a sample of 20,000 commercial loans made to U.S.
firms between 2000 and 207, Engelberg et al. (2012) suggest that in a matured market with a
highly developed financial and legal system and advanced investor protection, firms’
connections with banks through pre-existing personal relationship can alleviate the
information asymmetry and monitoring costs which in turn can reduce costs of borrowing
and covenants. This new evidence from mature market prompts an important question, which
has not yet been directly tested: due to the substantial differences in institutional
environments with respect to financial and legal systems and investor protection, do
connections with banks in an emerging market such as China also results in a lower cost of
borrowing? And if this is the case, is it through the same mechanism of reducing information
asymmetry and enhancing bank monitoring as in a developed market?
This paper directly and explicitly addresses this issue by constructing a notion of bank
connection, which is derived from the literature of political connection that studies the
consequences of establishment of close relationship with governments. It is well established
in the literature that a firm’s political connection will mitigate institutional constraint in
emerging markets, such as China, where entrepreneurial firms are discriminated against and
denied access to bank loans. Existing literature finds that political connection as capital can
help entrepreneurial firms access bank loans and reduce the cost of borrowing through their
rent seeking (Cull and Xu, 2003; Brandt and Li, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010). As
China’s institutional environment is recognized as having an underdeveloped financial and
legal system and weak investor protection, the banking sector is dominated by state
ownership of banks and state control of key resources necessary for corporate growth. Thus,
entrepreneurial firms in China face many obstacles of accessing finance and heavy
government regulations. In such an environment, political connection facilitates rent seeking,
which helps entrepreneurial firms overcome these market failures and avoid ideological
discrimination (Li et al., 2008), and political connection is regarded as an alternative to legal
protection (Chen et al., 2011a).
We differentiate ourselves from prior studies with respect to measurement of bank
relationships. The traditional way to measure political connection is to determine that either
one of the firm's executives or a large shareholder is a former or current government or
military official. We argue that this measure is too ambiguous in the specific context of bank
lending, as some type of officials may not have effective or direct influence over the bank's
2

lending decisions. In our study we propose an alternative and direct measurement for the
firm’s bank connection. In this study, a firm is identified as having a bank connection if any
of its top executives, including the Chairman, CEO or other executives, the independent
directors on its board or its largest shareholder currently work or have formerly worked as an
executive or manager in the banking sector. The reason for including the connections of
independent directors is that their monitoring role in China’s firms is impaired because their
nomination is approved by the controlling shareholders, who may nominate connected
independent directors with the aim of using their network with banking to bring benefits to
themselves (Lin, Piotroski, Tan and Yang, 2012). When a relationship exists between a senior
banker and a senior member of the borrower’s management, relationship-embedded financial
contracting should occur, not only due to the nature of the relationship, but because rent
creation and allocation occur through the relationship. Therefore, we conjecture that bank
connections can encourage rent seeking from banks, and reduce collateral requirements.
In addition, recent literature on corruption suggests that in a lending market, corruption
has significant impact on firms’ access to external finance. Some literature finds that
corruption reduces bank lending efficiency. For example, using an across-country study,
Beck et al. (2006) find that corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms’ raising
external finance, and some subsequent studies try to find ways to curtail lending corruption
(Barth et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2011). In addition, in China, due to the low lending
efficiency and huge rents available resulting from government intervention through heavily
regulated credit market, corruption is quite pervasive in financial institutions (Pei, 2008).
However recent studies have provided evidence that corruption can benefit some firms in
China. For example, Cai, Fang and Xu (2011) find that although bribery to government
officials deteriorates firm performance overall, this effect is much less pronounced for firms
located in regions with low quality of government service and those subject to severe
government expropriation. Furthermore, Chen, Liu and Su (2013) provide evidence that in
China corruption plays a role in improving lending efficiency and aids entrepreneurial firms.
Thus, we expect that in China embedded with insufficient or unreliable legal protection for
investors, connected firms offer bribes in exchange for the favoured allocation of economic
rents in form of accessing bank loans and lower cost of borrowing. A natural question can be
raised: is corruption the channel for the connections to play the role in accessing external
finance and a lower cost of borrowing? We will answer the question of whether and how the
bank relationship interacts with corruption in affecting firms’ borrowing cost and bank
lending efficiency.
3

To answer these questions, we extend existing studies by explicitly examining the
impacts that bank connection, corruption, and their combination have on firms’ collateral
requirements, using China’s listed entrepreneurial firms as the sample. We focus on collateral
for two reasons. First, since the recent global financial crisis of 2007, creditors have
expanded collateral requirements for their fund lending, and this observed tendency has again
attracted considerable attention from academics and practitioners (Harrington, 2009). Second,
extant studies suggest that collateral is a key ingredient used to enforce loan contracts as a
response to information asymmetry (the source of adverse selection and moral hazard)
(Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991; Jimenez et al., 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2012).
In our study we use a sample of Chinese entrepreneurial firms because it offers an
excellent environment to study bank relationships, for three reasons. First, China is the largest
emerging market with a financial and legal system substantially different from that of
developed countries. The relationship between borrowers and lenders in China is strongly
influenced by borrowers’ political connections due to its unique institutional settings.
Because entrepreneurial firms have suffered social and political discrimination, they have
incentives to establish political connections to access bank loans, which are mainly controlled
by the state (Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Chen, Lobo, Wang and Yu, 2011). Therefore,
this unique institutional setting, under which borrows and lenders are related to each other
through bank connections, expands our understanding of political connection literature. This
institutional environment allows us to answer the question: do firms’ bank connections matter,
and if they do, do these relationships work the same way as in developed countries?
Second, in an emerging market, corporate sector growth will be hampered due to
financial constraints (La Porta et al., 2000). In this sense, the coexistence of both underdevelopment in the financial and legal system and high growth in the non-state sector in
China allows a better understanding of the available sources of external finance, and the
channel through which it achieves. Chen et al. (2013) argue that corruption in China is
effective in improving capital allocation and aids non-state sector growth, and we are
motivated to investigate through which channel corruption is exercised.
Third, in a loan market where interest rates are not regulated by governments, a lender
can price credit risk through interest rates as a substitute for pledging collateral. In this case
academics face a potential endogeneity issue, where bank connection and collateral might
have a joint impact on interest rates. China’s credit market provides a powerful setting to

4

address this question because the interest rates charged on bank loans are relatively regulated 1,
which limits lenders to pricing loans through interest rates. Finally, China's economic
stimulus package represented an exogenous shock with respect to any individual firm; such a
shock alleviates the endogeneity concern of bank connection. For these three reasons, our
sample facilitates our research of exploring the economic implications of bank connections,
corruption and collateral.
Following both univariate and multivariate analysis, we find that collateral is
significantly lower for firms connected with banks through their executives, largest
shareholders or independent directors. Our results indicate that the average collateral
requirement is 5% lower in bank connected firms compared with non-bank connected firms.
Furthermore, we find that corruption relates to lower collateral, and the negative association
between bank connection and collateral becomes more pronounced if the firm is able to spend
more on corruption. An increase of one standard deviation in corruption reduces the average
requirement for collateral by 3.4% for bank connected firms. The above evidence supports
the view that bank connections facilitate rent seeking from banking sector through corruption.
In other words, bank connected firms are able to offer bribes to banking officials in exchange
for favoured loan terms. Our findings suggest that in an emerging market, bank connection
encourages rent seeking from borrowers to lenders, rather than reducing information
asymmetry or monitoring costs, as in developed markets. Our results also corroborate the
findings of several studies that firms’ bank relationships and corruption have a significant
effect on credit market outcomes in a relationship-based economy. In particular, Li et al.
(2008) document that politically connected firms can obtain larger loans from banks.
Engelberg et al. (2012) report that borrower-lender relationships relate to a lower cost of
borrowing and covenants. Chen et al. (2013) provide evidence that corruption is helpful in
improving lending efficiency and aiding entrepreneurial firms.
In addition, from the perspective of government intervention, we provide evidence that
an economic stimulus package announcement reduces banking lending efficiency. We find
that an economic stimulus package mitigates the improving effect of corruption on collateral
requirements. In additional tests, we find that bank connections facilitate rent seeking through
corruption, which results in the improvement of bank lending efficiency. Our results of the
effect of bank connections and corruption on collateral are robust when we take the

1

The People’s Bank of China sets a lending rate as a benchmark for financial institutions to negotiate on each
specific loan.
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endogeneity of bank connections into consideration, as well as alternative measures of bank
connections and collateral.
Our study is related to several strands of the growing volume of literature. First, our
study contributes to the literature on law, finance and growth by extending the research field
that examines the financial implications of the institutional environment. The interesting
phenomenon of the coexistence in China of both an underdeveloped financial and legal
system and high non-state sector growth has been explained by a relationship-based economy
(Allen et al., 2005) and the use of unconventional governance methods, such as corruption, in
the allocation of scarce economic resources (Chen et al., 2013). Our study extends further by
identifying bank connections that facilitates corruption to obtain favoured loan terms for
Chinese listed entrepreneurial firms.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, there is no direct evidence on the relation between
firms’ bank connections and lending efficiency. In this paper, we provide evidence for the
presence of bank connections and corruption, and their joint effects on lending efficiency.
This adds to the recent corruption literature. In addition, we explicitly use bank connections
to capture firm behaviour in seeking rents from banks; this is a departure from previous
studies that used former and current political connections as a proxy for rent seeking (Fan,
Wong and Zhang, 2007; Faccio, 2010). We advance the traditional definition of political
connections from two aspects. First, we develop a concept of bank connections that is more
direct than the idea of general political connections with the government. Second, we also
include the independent directors’ connection, which is broader than that of executives. Our
findings complement previous studies by providing evidence that bank connections have a
stronger effect than political connections on reducing collateral. We also add to the literature
on the financial implications of political connections. While Sapienza (2004) and Faccio
(2006, 2010) argue that connections with the government, whether voluntary (political
connections) or involuntary (government ownership), will help firms access financial
assistance from the government in the form of subsidies and loan supports, we expand their
studies by using firms’ collateral as a direct and explicit proxy for this government-based
benefit in terms of reduced collateral requirements.
Third, we add to the literature on the borrower-lender relationship and its financial
implications on credit market outcomes. Using U.S. firms as the sample, Engelberg et al.
(2012) find that pre-existing personal relationships between the respective management of
firms and banks relate to lower interest rates due to better information flow. In particular,
they focus on the firm-bank personal relationship achieved if the respective managers have
6

previously worked together. In the spirit of Engelberg et al. (2012), we construct an
alternative for firm-bank relationship, namely bank connection, if the firm’s management
worked or is currently working as management of a bank. We argue that in China, with its
underdeveloped institutional systems and the extensive government intervention in the
financial system, entrepreneurial firms face discrimination by state-owned banks, who tend to
award their loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Entrepreneurial firms therefore are
likely to use their existing bank relationship and/or develop new ones with banks to seek
rents from the institutional environment, as well as justify their existence. Using
entrepreneurial firms as the sample, we document that a closer connection with banks
facilitates access to bank loans with favourable terms in the form of lower collateral
requirements. Our evidence also adds to another strand of literature on relationship banking,
which argues that banks have an incentive to develop closer relationships with borrowers to
facilitate monitoring, which can overcome moral hazards and adverse selection, and then to
reduce the requirement for collateral (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Menkholl, Neuberger and
Rungruxsirivorn, 2012)2. Last, because China has a concentrated ownership structure that is
similar to those outside the U.S., our findings can suggest some international implications.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional
background and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data methodology; Section
4 discusses the empirical results and additional tests; and Section 5 concludes.

2. Institutional background and development of hypotheses
In this section we describe the institutional background in China that is related to our
study, and develop corresponding hypotheses based on existing theories and China’s
institutional system.
2.1 Institutional background
2.1.1 Banking industry and bank lending decisions
In the late 1970s, the Chinese government launched a significant reform of the banking
industry3. In the early 1980s, the government established four wholly state-owned banks (the
Big Four), which took control of all the lending functions of the People’s Bank of China (the

2

However the measures for relationship banking used in the existing literature are often arbitrary. For example,
Chang, Liao, Yu and Zheng (2010) use the frequency of borrowing and the duration of lending and state
ownership as proxies, while Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2011) and Menkhoff, Neuberger and
Rungruxsirivorn (2012) focus on previous lending record.
3
During this period, China also initiated economic reform aimed at transforming from a planned to a marketoriented economy.
7

central bank). In 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks 4 were established and took
over policy lending from the Big Four banks. In 1996, joint stock commercial banks and city
banks began to emerge.
Originally, bank loans mainly took the form of credit loans, which were granted at low
interest rates and without any guarantees or collateral. Such loans were one of the causes of a
higher ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). As this market-oriented economic reform
deepened, banks became increasingly aware of loan risks, and from the 1990s they
increasingly demanded guarantees or collateral. Indeed, according to a survey of 13 domestic
banks between 2000 and 2005, the average collateral of secured loans increased from 22% to
32% of all loans granted (Yang and Qian, 2008), of which land or buildings became the most
acceptable form of collateral. Banks also demanded the equivalent value of fixed assets as
collateral before granting loans, especially to privately controlled firms (Yeung, 2009).
In addition, there was discrimination in granting these bank loans in favour of SOEs over
entrepreneurial firms (Wei and Wang, 1997, Cull and Xu, 2003), with state-owned banks
often lending to SOEs for political, employment and taxation purposes rather than
profitability. As Yeung (2009) discussed, for these banks (Big Four SOCBs, policy banks,
joint stock commercial banks and city banks), the decision of whether to grant loans was
often determined by unofficial assessment criteria. SOEs tended to receive loans without
pledging the necessary collateral because of state ownership, while entrepreneurial firms
were expected to pledge collateral by securing their fixed assets to the equivalent value of the
collateral required.

In other words, banks made a rational decision to bias their lending

against entrepreneurial firms based on the higher risks and higher transaction and riskevaluation costs.
2.1.2 Corruption in China
Corruption is acknowledged to be an international phenomenon, especially in developing
and emerging economies with underdeveloped financial systems, weak legal protection of
investors and severe government intervention. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that the
structure of government institutions and the political process are very important determinants
of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies
experience very high corruption levels. International evidence confirms that political
decentralization could impede coordination and exacerbate incentives for officials at different
levels to ‘overgraze’ the common bribe base (Fan et al., 2009), and state ownership of media
4

These are State Development Banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export and Import
Bank of China.
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is associated with high levels of bank corruption (Houston et al., 2011). In China, despite
more than three decades of economic reform, the government exercises absolute control over
the institutional and financial systems, and corruption acts as the proverbial grease for the
bureaucratic wheels of an otherwise unmotivated banking system (Chen et al., 2013).
According to a Transparency International survey in 2003, China’s corruption-perception
index ranked in the lower half, with a score of 3.5 (on a scale of 1 to 10, with lower scores
indicating greater public perceptions of corruption); while in 2012, this index (now calculated
on a scale of 1 to 100) increased to 39, it was still in the lower half. For example, Mr Jinhuo
Zhou, a former administrator in Fujian Province, took $16 million in bribes in exchange for
the awarding of industrial and commercial contracts under his control. China’s financial
sector is also beset by corruption. Kickbacks for loan approvals are routine. For example, in
2012 eight top executives of the Agricultural Bank of China in Beijing were discovered
taking bribes of around 10 million RMB for arranging a 0.7 billion RMB loan. Chen et al.
(2013) also report that the average loss for the banks in each corruption case is 18 million
RMB.
2.1.3 Economic stimulus package
The global financial crisis hit China hard, and induced a domestic-economy slowdown in
second half of 2008. In response to the financial crisis, on 5 November 2008, the Chinese
government announced a 4 trillion RMB (about $586 billion) economic stimulus package –
constituting 12.5% of total GDP in spending from the fourth quarter of 2008 through 2010.
The economic stimulus package refers specifically to investment spending. Of the total 4
trillion RMB plan, the central government made a commitment to directly fund 1.18 trillion
RMB of the investment, or 30% of the overall program, with the remainder to be funded by
banks and local governments. Eventually the central government’s input to the stimulus
totalled 1.6 trillion RMB, more than originally planned. Meanwhile, the local governments
actively echoed the central stimulus program, which accounted for 70% to 75% of budgetary
expenditures on fixed investment.
Bank lending was the main source for investment spending in the stimulus package.
Since the announcement of the central government’s stimulus package, bank credit has grown
at an explosive pace due to the confluence of explicit policies designed to ease provision of
credit. The urgency and politicization of the stimulus sent banks a powerful signal that they
were expected to rapidly ramp up lending. Moreover, government and political leaders'
directions effectively eliminated all personal responsibility for the lending decisions,
suggesting that bank loan officers would not be held accountable for loans they made, so long
9

as the loans supported the investment plan (Naughton, 2009; Wong, 2011)5. In particular,
new bank credit grew by 4.2 trillion RMB in 2008 and more than doubled to 9.6 trillion RMB
in 2009, although it fell slightly to 8 trillion RMB in 2010.
2.2 Hypothesis development
2.3.1 Bank connections and corruption
In this paper, we derive bank connection from the literature on political connection. We
argue that bank connection is a far more important institutional setting and offers a direct
measurement for easier access to bank loans, particularly for emerging markets.
Political connection is a common phenomenon across the world, especially in countries
with weak financial institutions and concentrated ownership structures (Faccio, Masulis and
McConnell, 2006). As a voluntary approach to connecting with the government, political
connections can facilitate a firm’s rent seeking and assistance from the government (Chen, Li,
Su and Sun, 2011). In particular, Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) find that for
financially distressed firms, politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out by the
government than non-politically connected firms. Meanwhile, a large amount of evidence
from both developed and emerging markets shows that political connections matter through
preferential access to bank finance, and can affect the credit market and terms of the loan
contract (Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Bliss and
Gul, 2012). Among them, Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010) provide evidence that politically
connected firms are regarded as a lower level of risk and relate to a higher bond rating and
lower cost of borrowing.
However, bank connection is a more direct measurement that facilitates borrowers’ rent
seeking. Along the lines of definitions for political connection, we define that a firm is
connected with a bank if one of the top executives is working or used to work as the governor
of a bank or bank branch (defined in detail later). Normally, there are two ways by which
bank connections may help firms access bank loans with lower collateral. On one hand, bankconnected executives can communicate directly with bank executives to secure a bank loan
with fewer collateral requirements. On the other hand, connections with the banks can help
firms overcome market failure and avoid social and political discrimination, and in turn,
obtain secured bank loans. This means that creditors are likely to require less collateral on
their lending to bank-connected firms than non-connected firms. In other words, bank
connections can alleviate creditors’ concerns over losses on these loans. Therefore, we expect
5

For example, the governor of Guangxi province encouraged banks’ enthusiasm for disbursing loan funds and
speeding up bank loan disbursement through every means possible.
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that collateral requirements are lower for firms with bank connections. Thus, we construct
our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: Collateral requirements are lower for firms with bank connections
For our next hypothesis, we investigate the mechanism through which bank connection
works with respect to corruption. In China, a salient feature is the dominant state ownership
of the banking sector, and the prudential policy that imposes direct control on banks' lending
decisions. Due to the vulnerabilities presented by an underdeveloped legal system, the vibrant
non-state sector and its growth depend largely on informal financing based on relationship
and unconventional governance (Allet et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009). As China’s banking
sector is beset by corruption, a recent strand of literature champions the view that corruption
helps improve credit allocation efficiency and non-state sector growth in the context of
emerging markets, specifically those in which legal protection is insufficient or unreliable
(Chen et al., 2013). We argue that through bribery, entrepreneurial firms are able to secure
bank credit and obtain favourable loan terms in the form of reduced collateral. Here, we
consider the interacted effect of bank connection and corruption on collateral, and we argue
that bank connections facilitate corruption, and corruption is exactly the channel through
which bank connection affects collateral. In other words, bank connection provides a channel
through which briber gives bribery to the bank officials who control the interest. Empirically,
we expect that the relationship between bank connection and collateral to become stronger
with increased corruption. This evidence is consistent with the view of rent seeking, rather
than expertise provision or monitoring. Thus, we construct our hypothesis as follows:
H2: Bank connections facilitate corruption, and corruption strengthens the relationship
between bank connections and collateral requirements.
2.3.2 Economic stimulus package
Taking on the new angle of government intervention, we further extend our hypothesis
relating to the effect of the government's economic stimulus package. Over the whole period
of the package, China's central and local governments have been trying to achieve social and
political goals by promoting firm investments and economic growth in business activities
through their majority ownership in SOEs. In addition, with the enforcement of the stimulus
package and with the support of both central and local governments, a huge bank credit has
been increased rapidly as politically driven lending at the firm level for investment. Because
of government favouritism, SOEs were playing a critical role with a substantial increase in
investment which is mostly complained as ‘the state owned firms advances and non-state
retreats’. In other words, since the enforcement of the economic stimulus package, most of
11

the funds have been injected to SOEs for investment, and the private sector has been
hampered in its development (Wong, 2011). We investigate whether this will worsen the
private sector financing environment, and bank connection will have more critical effects on
collateral after the economic stimulus package. Bank connections facilitate rent seeking,
which can reduce collateral; after the economic stimulus package, this effect in
entrepreneurial firms became stronger because connected entrepreneurial firms had more
incentives to seek rents from the banking sector, as they were competing for loan resources
from state-controlled borrowers. On the other hand, in a bribery scenario, bribers bid for
more credit allocation and offer the highest bribe in exchange for rent creation (Chen et al.,
2013). In this sense, after the economic stimulus package, when capital allocation becomes
driven by policy and fewer bank loans are available for entrepreneurial firms, we expect that
the benefits of reducing collateral through corruption will be eliminated to some extent, as the
corrupt officials can award limited contracts. Consistent with our discussion above, we
hypothesise as follows:
H3a: The negative relation between bank connections and collateral requirements
becomes stronger for post-economic stimulus package period.
H3b: The corruption effect on bank connections and collateral association becomes
weaker for the post-economic stimulus package period.

3. Data and variables
3.1 The sample selection and classification of bank loans
We commence our sample with comprehensive data from all the listed entrepreneurial
firms on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the Chinese Stock and
Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR)6. We combine the data from the balance
sheet, income statement and corporate governance sub-datasets between 2006 and 2009
because information on a firm’s loan balance is available during this period. The database
provides detailed information on loan balance with respect to loan type7, lender type and
other contractual terms. Our manual data gathering process begins with a sample of 42,431
observations for loan balance, from which we identify the credit, guaranteed and
collateralized loan balance. We then sum each loan balance for each firm for each year to get
one firm-year observation of total credit, guaranteed and collateralized loan balance. Finally,
6

This database has also been used by previous studies in China (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007).
The loan type refers to whether the loan is realized, secured by credit, or secured by collateral or third-party
guarantee, etc.
7
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we gather 5,263 firm-year observations. From this total population we exclude 106 firm-year
observations flagged with ST and *ST, because they denote special treatment due to
irregularity in the financial reporting, and negative profit for two or three consecutive years.
We also exclude 152 firm-year observations in the financial industry because of their unique
accounting standards. Finally, we delete 100 firm-year observations with missing
observations on main variables used in our analysis and 75 firm-year observations with no
outstanding loans. Finally, to remain consistent with our previous discussion of sample
selection, we further exclude every firm with the state listed as the ultimate controlling
shareholder. Our final sample consists of 640 listed firms and 1,973 firm-year observations.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution across different types of bank loans identified during
our sample period. In the full population, we identify the following types of bank loans: (1)
credit loans, (2) secured loans (including guaranteed loan, pledged loan and mortgage loan),
(3) on-balance sheet loans (including project financing and note discounting), (4) off-balance
sheet loans (including a letter of credit, note acceptance and entrust loan) and (5) other types
of bank loans. Among these types of loans the database does not specify exactly what is
secured to obtain the loan, so we manually search for information from the firms’ annual
reports and quarter reports on whether the loan has been secured by the securities and
tangible assets of borrowers or third parties. We then classify these loans into guaranteed
loans, pledged loans and mortgage loans. Among these types of bank loans, we further
calculate the collateralized loan amount by summing the pledged loans and mortgage loans.
We further divide all the bank loans into short-term and long-term loans. From Table 1,
we find that the amount of credit loans awarded to state-controlled firms is 2,542 million
RMB (the sum of 1,172 and 1,370 million RMB), almost eight times more than the 312.9
million RMB (189.9 + 123) awarded to entrepreneurial firms (Table 1); this indicates that
state-controlled firms are more likely to obtain credit loans due to the government’s implicit
guarantee. We divide secured loans into guaranteed, pledged and mortgage loans. Across the
firm ownership structure we find that the requirement for collateral is lower for statecontrolled firms and higher for entrepreneurial firms. In particular, the ratios of both shortterm and long-term collateralized loans are 15.99% (5.37% + 10.62%) and 40.1% (13.5% +
26.6%) respectively for state-owned enterprises, compared with 24.61% (4.76% + 19.85%)
and 46.7% (19.4% + 27.3%) for entrepreneurial firms. It is interesting to note that collateral
is even required for short-term loans. One reason could be that long-term loans that mature
within one year with collateral pledged are classified as short-term loans in our summary.
The other reason could be that our sample covers the post-crisis period, during which the
13

requirement for collateral was increased by banks in response to higher credit risks. We also
identify on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet loans. These types of loans make up a
relatively lower proportion of the total outstanding loans in both state-controlled firms and
entrepreneurial firms. We further notice that short-term loans account for less than 50% of
total loan amount, and compared with previous studies, our updated summary confirms that
state-owned enterprises are more likely to take out long-term loans (Firth, Lin, Liu and
Wong, 2009) while pledging lower collateral. In entrepreneurial firms we find that short-term
loans are the main source of financing, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total amount of
loans. Moreover, the total amount of loans is lower than that for state-owned enterprises.
Overall, the figures in Table 1 support the argument that entrepreneurial firms are treated
unfavourably in state-dominated financial markets (Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008).
Table 1. Distribution and classification of bank loans for SOEs and entrepreneurial firms8
Short term
Long term
Amounts
Percentage
Amounts
Percentage
Panel A: State-owned enterprises
Credit loan
1,172
18.18%
1,370
18.1%
Secured loan
1. Guaranteed loan
503
7.80%
538
7.1%
2. Pledged loan
346
5.37%
1,020
13.5%
3. Mortgage loan
685
10.62%
2,019
26.6%
On-balance sheet loan
1. Project financing
874
13.56%
0
0
2. Note discounting
649
10.07%
18.7
0.2%
Off-balance sheet loan
1. Letter of credit
141
2.19%
0
0
2. Note acceptance
102
1.58%
0
0
3. Entrust loan
313.7
4.87%
474
6.3%
Others
1,662
25.78%
2,140
28.2%
Total
6,447.7
100.00%
7,580
100.0%
Panel B: Entrepreneurial firms
Credit loan
189.9
7.85%
123
10.0%
Secured loan
1. Guaranteed loan
270.6
11.18%
192
15.6%
2. Pledged loan
115.2
4.76%
239
19.4%
3. Mortgage loan
480.2
19.85%
337
27.3%
On-balance sheet loan
1. Project financing
448
18.51%
0
0
2. Note discounting
103
4.26%
0
0
Off-balance sheet loan
1. Letter of credit
33.9
1.40%
0
0
2. Note acceptance
69.1
2.86%
0
0
3. Entrust loan
216
8.93%
58.5
4.7%
Others
494
20.41%
283
23.0%
Total
2,419.8
100.00%
1,232.5
100.0%
Note: all values in million RMB.

3.2 Collateral
8

In Table 1, we report the distribution and classification of bank loans for SOEs for a comparison to
entrepreneurial firms. However, for the rest of the paper we only use entrepreneurial firms as our sample for
empirical analysis.
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Our main measurement for firm collateral is the ratio of total loans collateralised to total
loans outstanding at the end of each year. In additional tests we consider alternative measures
such as:
Collateral = Collateralized loans / Total loans outstanding
The literature also uses other proxies for collateral, such as the collateral required on a
typical loan (Cull and Xu, 2005), asset collateralizability (Binsbergen, Graham and Yang,
2010) and collateral presence (Jimenez, Salas and Saurina, 2006). In the additional tests we
consider these alternative measures.
3.3 Bank connections
To further examine the mitigating effects of bank connections, we collect data on the
career paths and former working experience of each firm's top executive9 and independent
director by searching press and online news resources, and combine this information with the
executive resumes provided by the CSMAR database. Consistent with our discussion above,
we identify a relationship that is more direct and relevant for influencing bank lending: the
bank connection. The definition of corporate-bank connection in our study follows the spirit
of the definition of political connection derived from Faccio (2010). We assert that a
company is defined as connected to a bank if at least one person in the top management team
(including the Chairman of the board, CEO, CFO, executive directors or independent
directors) and the largest shareholders were or are currently the governor or managers of a
bank. In our definition, we consider all the banks, including the Big Four banks, joint
commercial banks and foreign banks at different levels, such as headquarters, branches and
sub-branches. To avoid potential selection bias, we also consider the executive bank
connection and independent director connection separately in the following empirical
analysis.
We summarize and compare these observations in Table 2. Panel A shows the four
categories of relationship (bank connections, political connections, no connections and both
bank and political connections) for both top executives and independent directors. We find
there are 192 observations where executives have bank connections and 149 observations
where independent directors have bank connections. In addition, there are 70 observations
where only executives have bank connections and 41 observations where only independent
directors have bank connections. In Panel B, we further merge the information reported in
Panel A to directly show the distributions of bank connections and political connections in

9

The top executive includes the CEO, Chairman, and other executive directors.
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detail. For example, in row 1, ‘Bank connections’, the figure of 150 indicates there are 150
observations of firms with bank connections only. There are 915 observations of political
connection: 330 where both executives and independent board have political connections,
310 where only independent board members have them and 275 where only executives have
them.
Table 2. Distribution of top-executive and independent-director connections
Panel A: Distribution of connections interactions between top executives and independent directors
Independent director
Bank
No
Political
Both
Total
connections
connections
connections
connections
Top executives
Bank connections
39
70
83
0
192
No connections
41
720
310
8
1,079
Political connections
69
275
330
9
683
Both connections
0
3
16
0
19
Total
149
1,068
739
17
1,973
Panel B: Distribution for each category
Observations
Percentage
Bank connections
150
7.60%
Broad bank connections
338
17.13%
No connections
720
36.49%
Political connections
915
46.38%
Broad political connections
1,128
57.17%
Both connections
36
1.82%
Total
1,973
100%
Note: The values in the above table are the observations in each interaction group. Both connections mean at
least one of the top executives or independent directors has both bank connection and political connection. Bank
connections include firm year observations with bank connected executives or independent directors only.
Broad bank connections include all firm year observations if the firm has bank connections and both
connections. Political connections include firm year observations with politically connected executives or
independent directors only. Broad political connections include all firm year observations if the firm has
political connections and both connections.

3.4 Corruption
Following Cai et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013), we choose entertainment and travel
costs (ETCs) as the proxy for corruption. In Chinese firms’ accounting books, ETCs are a
fudge item used to build relationships (Cai et al., 2011). In practice, ETCs include expenses
for meals, gifts, touring and transportation and the normal travelling expenses required by
firms in their normal business operations. Besides legitimate business travel and other
expenses, ETCs are commonly used as an accounting category to reimburse any expenditures
used to bribe government officials, clients and suppliers, or simply to account for implicit
CEO pay and managerial excesses. As our sample only includes listed entrepreneurial firms,
implicit CEO pay and managerial excesses should be immaterial as a component of ETCs,
which mainly consists of grease money, protection money and normal business expenditures
(Chen et al., 2013). Empirically, we scale ETCs by sales in the regression analysis.
3.5 Control variables
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To address and isolate the effect of ownership structure on the requirements for collateral,
we include a set of control variables that have already been shown to exert potential effects
on collateral. We control for firm characteristics, loan characteristics and corporate
governance so they are consistent with arguments by Jimenez, Salas and Saurina, (2006) and
Chen, Lobo, Wang and Yu (2011). All variables are defined in Table 3.
Table 3. Variable definitions
Variable name
Variable definition
Panel A: Collateral and ownership structure
Collateral
Collateralized loans / Total loans
Bank connections
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has bank connections only
ETCs
Entertainment and travel costs / Sales
Political connections
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has political connections only
ESP
A dummy variable equal to 1 for post-economic stimulus package
period and 0 otherwise
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Firm size (Size)
Natural log of firm total assets
Cash-flow volatility
The volatility of cash flows for previous three years
Return on assets (ROA)
Net income / Total assets
Board size (Board)
Natural log of total number of directors on the board
Independent director (Indep)
Ratio of independent directors to total directors
Leverage (Lev)
Total debts / Total assets
Tangibility (Tang)
Net property, plant and equipment / Total assets
Sales growth (Sales)
Growth rate of sales for each year
Prime rate (Prime)
Prime lending rate set by the People’s Bank of China
Debt structure (Structure)
Bank loans / Total debts
Cost of debt financing
(Interest expenses + capitalized interest) / Total debts
Guarantee
Guaranteed loans / Total debts

4. Empirical results
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 4 provides the summary statistics for our sample, including all the variables we
will use for the univariate and multivariate tests. The results show that the mean (median) of
the collateral ratio is 35.47% (35.25%), which is higher than 26.2% (13.1%), the mean
(median) value of collateral reported by Chen, Lobo, Wang and Yu (2011) for the period
between 2001 and 2006. The average ETCs-to-sales ratio is 1.38%, comparable to the 1.50%
reported by Cai et al. (2011) and 1.14% by Chen et al. (2013). We also notice that the board
size in China averages 8.73, of which 3.15 are independent directors. The average proportion
of independent directors is 36.08%, which is slightly higher than the requirements of the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that independent directors must account
for at least one-third of the total numbers on boards for all listed firms. In Panel C, we
summarise the collateral year by year over the period 2006 to 2009. Obviously, we find that
the ratio of total loans pledged has been increasing, especially after 2007 when China was hit
by the global financial crisis, after which banks began to require more collateral.
17

Table 4. Summary statistics
Mean
Panel A: Collateral and ownership structure
Collateral
35.47%
ETCs / Sales
1.38%
Bank connections
7.6%
Political connections
46.38%
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Firm size (Size) in millions
2,360
CF volatility
8.42
Return on assets (ROA)
4.45%
Board size (Board)
8.73
Independent director (Indep)
3.15
Leverage (Lev)
44.73%
Tangibility (Tang) in millions
1,410
Sales growth (Sales)
108%
Prime rate (Prime)
3.07%
Debt structure (Structure)
9.97%
Cost of debt
8.49%
Guarantee
26.20%
Panel C: Collateral sorted by year
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009

Median

Observations

35.25%
0.67%
0
0

1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973

1,270
9.56
4.52%
9
3
45.55%
715
106%
3.25%
2.58%
8.49%
5.12%
Collateral
32.00%
35.78%
36.45%
39.85%

1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973

4.2 Bank connections and collateral
In this section we examine the association between corporate bank connection and
collateral requirement using both univariate and multivariate analyses. In Table 5 Panel A,
we present the difference tests of collateral requirements and other firm characteristics across
firms with and without bank connections. This table shows that the collaterals are
significantly lower in firms with a close connection with the bank, whereas the values of
other variables are higher in bank-connected firms, except for cash-flow volatility, return on
assets (ROA) and cost of debt. When we place them together we find that bank connections
help firms to seek rents from the governments and benefit from favourable loan terms in the
form of lower collateral requirement (Collateral), as well as higher leverage level (Leverage),
higher bank loan ratio (Debt structure) and lower interest rate (Cost of debt). We also find
from the univariate tests that bank connections can also bring firms lower cost of debt and
higher guaranteed loans. In Panel B, we further split total bank connections into bank
connection through top executives and shareholders (Exe_bank) and through independent
directors (Indep_bank), and compare the collateral difference in each of these groups with
that in the group with no connections. In particular, the average collateral requirements in
Exe_bank and Indep_bank firms are 32.98% and 35.02%, which are significantly lower than
38.25% in the no-connection firms (t-test values are -3.38 and -3.23, respectively).
Table 5. Difference tests between firms with and without bank connections
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Bank connection
No bank connection
Panel A: Comparison between bank connection and no bank connection
Collateral
34.55%
38.25%
Firm size (million)
2,460
2,330
CF volatility
8.23%
8.48%
Return on assets
3.32%
4.82%
Board size
8.89
8.68
Independent director
3.23
3.12
Leverage
47.95%
43.67%
Tangibility (million)
1,450
1,400
Sales growth
119%
105%
Debt structure
11.42%
9.49%
Cost of debt
8.37%
8.52%
Guarantee
27.84%
25.66%
Panel B: Difference tests
Exe_bank
Indep_bank
32.98%
35.02%
Exe_bank vs. No connection
-5.27%***(-3.38)
Indep_bank vs. No connection -3.23%**(-2.55)
** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Difference tests
-3.70%**(-2.74)
130(0.62)
-0.25%(-0.78)
-1.50%**(-2.48)
0.21**(2.37)
0.11***(3.61)
4.28%***(4.15)
50(0.35)
14%(1.36)
1.93%**(2.34)
-0.15%***(-2.65)
2.18%**(2.26)
No connection
38.25%

To complement our univariate tests, we also conduct a regression analysis by estimating
the following equation:

Collateralit   0  1 Bankit   2 Sizeit   3Tangibilityit   4 Salesit
  4 Leverageit   5 Structureit   6Costit   7 Guaranteeit
  8Volatilityit   9 ROAit  10 Boardit  11Indepit

(1)

 12 Primeit   it
where Collateral is the fraction of collateralized loans; Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the firm is connected to banks and 0 otherwise; Size is the log of firm total assets;
Tangibility is the log of firm’s tangible assets; Sales is the firm’s sales growth rate; Leverage
is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Structure is the ratio of bank loans to total debt; Cost is
the interest rate charged on total debt; Guarantee is the fraction of guaranteed loans;
Volatility is the standard deviation of the cash flow of the previous three years; ROA is the
return on assets; Board is the log of total number of directors on boards; Indep is the ratio of
independent directors to total directors; and Prime is the prime lending rate. We also include
industry and year dummy variables to control for industry and year fixed effects. The results
of the effect of bank connection on collateral are reported in Table 6.
Across the three specifications we find that bank connection is negatively related to the
collateral required, especially the estimates from column 1, which show that the coefficient
on the bank connection is -0.05 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.26).
This result indicates that the average amount of collateral requirement is 5% lower for firms
with bank connections, while everything else is held constant. Hence, the effect of bank
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connection on collateral is economically and statistically significant. In addition, we
categorise bank connection into executive and independent-director bank connection, and
input each of them into the regression. In particular, executive bank connection includes
connection through both the top executive and the largest shareholder. The results are
reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6. The estimates from the two specifications in columns
2 and 3 provide further evidence to support our conjecture, while the estimated coefficient on
the Exe_bank dummy is -0.07, which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.61), and the
estimated coefficient on the Indep_bank dummy is -0.03, which is significant at the 5% level
(t-value is -2.06). This result indicates that the average amount of collateral required is
significantly lower in firms with a close connection with the bank, either through executives
or independent directors, than in firms with no bank connection. These estimated results are
consistent with our hypothesis H1 that bank connections facilitate rent seeking from the
banking sector, resulting in lower collateral requirements. Another concern of this regression
analysis is that there are several firm-year observations with both executive and independentdirector bank connections. Repeating our analysis when excluding these groups of firms
yields similar results to those reported in Table 6.
Consistent with the extant literature 10 , we also find similar effects for the control
variables. For example, the assets and tangible assets of larger firms are associated with
significantly lower collateral, which suggests they are able to access bank loans at a lower
cost due to a larger supply of securities on their loans. Moreover, the level of leverage and
fraction of long term loans as part of a firm’s total debt is positively related to collateral in the
loan, which indicates that the collateral required is higher when creditors realise the firm is
already levered. Moreover, as Menkhoff, Neuberger and Rungruxsirivorn (2012) discuss with
regards to emerging markets, third party guarantees and interest rates are substitutes for the
use of collateral. On this basis we consistently observed negative coefficients for these two
control variables, which indicate that they are substitutes for collateral. With regards to the
corporate governance variables, we find that the effects of the number of directors and the
ratio of independent directors on the board are insignificant, respectively.
Table 6. The effect of bank connection on collateral
Dependent variable is the collateral
Bank
-0.05**(-2.26)
Exe_bank
Indep_bank
Firm size
-0.07***(-3.38)
Tangibility
-0.10***(-5.70)

-0.07***(-2.61)
-0.08***(-3.50)
-0.10***(-5.19)

-0.03**(-2.06)
-0.07***(-3.19)
-0.09***(-4.93)

10

See Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006), Chen, Li, Su and Sun (2011) and Menkhoff, Neuberger and
Rungruxsirivorn (2012) for detailed discussions of the effects of control variables on collateral in loans.
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Sales growth
-0.01*(-1.64)
-0.01*(-1.69)
-0.01*(-1.71)
Leverage
0.36***(8.67)
0.34***(8.30)
0.34***(8.38)
Debt structure
0.52***(10.26)
0.52***(10.56)
0.53***(10.84)
Cost of debt
-0.03***(-4.91)
-0.03***(-4.79)
-0.03***(-4.68)
Guarantee
-0.22***(-10.67)
-0.23***(-11.04)
-0.23***(-11.03)
CF volatility
0.65***(3.08)
0.65***(3.48)
0.65***(3.41)
ROA
-0.05(-0.55)
-0.05(-0.55)
-0.05(-0.51)
Board size
-0.02(-0.45)
-0.02(-0.43)
-0.02(-0.49)
Independent director
-0.05(-0.31)
-0.05(-0.28)
-0.02(-0.15)
Prime rate
-0.12***(-7.55)
-0.12***(-7.53)
-0.12***(-7.61)
Constant
0.59**(2.30)
0.60**(2.29)
0.63**(2.40)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.33
0.36
0.35
Observations
1,973
1,973
1,973
The dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bankconnected firms and 0 for non-bank-connected firms. Exe_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bankconnected firms with an executive bank connection. Indep_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bankconnected firms with an independent-director bank connection. Definitions of all the other variables are as in
Table 3.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error,
clustered by the firm.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.3 Bank connections, corruption, and collateral
In this section we consider the mechanism through which the bank connection works to
attenuate collateral requirement, namely corporate bribery or corruption. The definition of
corporate corruption in our study follows the spirit of the argument derived from Cai et al.
(2011) and Chen et al. (2013). In particular, we use the ratio of ETCs to sales as the proxy for
corruption for the regression estimation.
We conduct the regression analysis to examine the effect of corruption on the association
between bank connections and collateral by including a set of control variables which may
have a potential effect on a firm’s requirement for collateral. To do so, we extend our
equation (1) by adding an extra variable, corruption, and interact with Bank connection
dummy variable. Table 7 provides the results of this regression analysis. The coefficients on
corruption variable are all negative and insignificant (t-values are -0.62, -0.77 and -0.76)
across three specifications. When we turn to the Bank dummy, Exe_bank dummy, and
Indep_bank dummy, and the interactive terms between these dummy variables and corruption,
we find negative coefficients on these terms which are consistent with the univariate tests and
our main hypotheses. Specifically, from column 1 the estimated coefficient of Bank dummy
is -0.05 and -3.42 for Bank dummy and corruption interaction term, which is significant at the
5% and 1% level respectively (t-values are -2.17 and -2.72, respectively), suggesting that the
average collateral pledged is 5% lower than that in non-bank-connected firms. In addition,
the coefficient of interaction between Bank dummy and corruption is -3.42 (t-value is -2.72),
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indicating that an increase of one-standard-deviation in corruption reduces the average
requirement for collateral by 3.42% for bank-connected firms while the effect is insignificant
in non-bank-connected firms (insignificant estimated coefficient on Corruption variable).
This result is consistent with our conjecture that bank connection is effective in reducing
collateral requirements through corruption, and bank connection is the bridge through which
corruption works. Our results also support the argument by Chen et al. (2013) that in China
where the legal and financial systems are underdeveloped, corruption plays a role in
improving efficiency and aids in entrepreneurial firm growth, through informal external
finance based on relationship.
To be consistent with the regression reported in Table 6, we rerun the regression by
splitting bank connection into executive bank connection and independent director bank
connection and report the results in column 2 and 3 in Table 7. For example in column 2, we
find that the estimated coefficients on Exe_bank and Exe_bank*Corruption are both negative
and significant (t-values are -2.23 and -2.62, respectively). This result is consistent with the
one when we focus on the bank connection in column 1, suggesting that an increase in onestandard-deviation in corruption reduces average collateral requirement by 3.80% in
executive bank-connected firms, and again this effect is insignificant in non-connected firms.
In column 3 where we turn to focus on independent director bank connection, we find that the
estimated coefficients on Indep_bank is marginally significant at the 10% level (t-value is 1.80), and the estimated coefficients on Indep_bank*Corruption is negative while
insignificant (t-value is -0.95), indicating that the reducing collateral of corruption through
independent directors bank connection is insignificant.
To be consistent with the univariate difference tests between sub-samples in Table 5, we
rerun the regression with three sub-samples, and these results are not reported in this paper.
The first one includes firms with executive bank connections and independent director bank
connections only, by excluding the firm-year observations without connections. The second
one includes firms with bank connections and no connection only, by excluding the firm-year
observations of independent director bank connections. From these two regressions, we find
the coefficients for both bank connections and interactive terms between bank connections
and corruption are negative and statistically significant. The third one includes firms with
independent director bank connections and no connections only, without including firm-year
observations of bank connections. The results from this regression suggest that the coefficient
for Indep_bank is marginally negative, which is complementary to the finding of our results
in Table 8. However the coefficient of the interactive term between Indep_bank and
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corruption is negative but not statistically significant. This result indicates that independent
director bank connection could reduce the requirement for collateral but is not as strong as
executive bank connections.
Overall, our results indicate that on average, corporate bank connections through top
executives and largest shareholders are more effective than that through independent
directors, and have a direct impact on reducing the collateral, which means that the
requirement for less collateral is associated with bank connection in emerging markets, at
least in the context of China. Moreover, our results propose an explanation to the coexisting
of weak legal system and high private sector growth in China. We offer support to Chen et al.
(2013) and extend to find that bank connection is the channel through which corruption is
exercised to improve capital allocation efficiency. We argue that the effect of borrowerlender relationship differs substantially across countries. In particular, this relationship in
developed countries, such as U.S., acts to alleviate information asymmetry (facilitate
information flow) or reduce monitoring costs which benefits firms with favoured loan terms.
However, in emerging market with underdeveloped financial and legal system, such as China,
firm’s bank connection acts primarily to facilitate rent seeking from the banking sector by
obtaining favoured loan terms. Here, though evidence from both developed and emerging
markets supports the view that close borrower-lender relationship relates to lower collateral
requirements, our results on corruption effect provide a supporting evidence for the view of
rent seeking. We argue that if bank connection works the same way in China as that in
developed countries to reduce the monitoring costs, corruption’s effect should be either
significant in reducing collateral in non-bank connection firms or insignificant in all types of
firms. The result in China shows that corruption works in bank-connected firms, suggesting
that bank connection is the channel through which corruption is used to seek rents from the
banking sector, and entrepreneurial firms pay bribes to officials as a means of rent seeking. In
other words, our results also support Allen et al. (2005) argument that in emerging market,
entrepreneurial firms’ growth depends on informal external financing based on relationship.
Table 7. The effect of corruption on bank connection-collateral association
Dependent variable is the collateral
Bank
-0.05**(-2.17)
Bank*Corruption
-3.42***(-2.72)
Exe_bank
-0.06**(-2.23)
Exe_bank*Corruption
-3.80***(-2.62)
Indep_bank
Indep_bank*Corruption
Corruption
-0.13(-0.62)
-0.25(-0.77)
Firm size
-0.07***(-3.24)
-0.07***(-3.47)
Tangibility
-0.10***(-5.64)
-0.10***(-5.22)
Sales growth
-0.01*(-1.79)
-0.02(-1.52)

-0.03*(-1.80)
-2.59(-0.95)
-0.24(-0.76)
-0.07***(-3.36)
-0.09***(-5.12)
-0.01*(-1.74)
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Leverage
0.37***(8.81)
0.34***(8.43)
0.34***(8.44)
Debt structure
0.51***(10.20)
0.51***(10.37)
0.51***(10.51)
Cost of debt
-0.03***(-4.84)
-0.03***(-4.74)
-0.03***(-4.77)
Guarantee
-0.22***(-10.55)
-0.23***(-10.95)
-0.23***(-11.01)
CF volatility
0.52***(2.99)
0.65***(3.42)
0.64***(3.45)
ROA
-0.06(-0.62)
-0.05(-0.50)
-0.06(-0.61)
Board size
-0.02(-0.47)
-0.02(-0.46)
-0.01(-0.40)
Independent director
-0.03(-0.21)
-0.06(-0.43)
-0.03(-0.22)
Prime rate
-0.12***(-7.47)
-0.12***(-7.55)
-0.12***(-7.55)
Constant
0.64**(2.49)
0.63**(2.40)
0.62**(2.39)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.34
0.34
0.34
Observations
1,973
1,973
1,973
Dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is
connected with the banks and 0 otherwise. Exe_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is connected
through top executives and largest shareholders. Indep_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is
connected through independent directors. Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 3.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and
are clustered by firm.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

4.4 Economic stimulus package
In this section we investigate the effect of economic stimulus package (ESP) on the
association between bank connection and collateral. To conduct a regression analysis, we
empirically create a new variable ESP, which is equal to 1 for the post-ESP period and 0 for
the pre-ESP period. We also interact the Pack dummy with the bank connection to examine
the effect of the ESP on the association between bank connection and collateral. The results
of this regression are provided in Table 8 column 1. We further examine the effect of
corruption before and after the economic stimulus package, so we also estimate the regression
by adding Corruption and interaction terms with Bank and ESP, and report the result in
column 2 in Table 8.
The initial results show that the bank connections across both specifications are
consistently negatively related to collateral. As Table 8 shows, our results also indicate that
the coefficients of the ESP dummy are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level
in column 1 (t-value is -1.92). In particular, the estimated coefficient of the ESP dummy
shown in column 1 is -0.02 which indicates that the average collateral on loans after the
economic stimulus package is approximately 3.75% lower than that before the ESP. In
addition, the estimated coefficient of the interactive terms between the bank connection and
ESP dummy is negative and statistically significant (the coefficient is -0.04, and t-value is 1.89). These results indicate that after the economic stimulus package, the average collateral
difference between firms with and without bank connections is dropped by nearly 4%. These
results are consistent with our hypothesis H3a in that bank connection matters stronger in
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reducing the requirements for collateral after the ESP. Then, we turn our concerns to column
2 where we test that whether the corruption effect differs before and after the economic
stimulus package. As can be seen from column 2 in Table 8, we find that the estimated
coefficients on Bank*Corruption and Corruption are both negative and consistent with those
reported in Table 7, indicating that corruption is effective in reducing collateral and obtaining
favoured loan terms, but only through bank connections. More important, we find that the
estimated coefficient on Bank*ESP*Corruption is positive and statistically significant at the
1% level (coefficient is 4.70 and t-value is 2.77). This result suggests that after the
announcement of the economic stimulus package, the effect of corruption on reducing
collateral requirements through bank connections has been attenuated, which support our
hypothesis H3b. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the results by dividing bank
connection into executive bank connection and independent director bank connection. In
general, the unreported results suggest that executive bank connection matters more than that
of independent director bank connection.
As with the economic stimulus package announced in 2008, bank lending decisions and
loan capital allocations have been driven by the political and prudential policy imposed,
which are hugely secured for SOEs. Overall, these estimates indicate that economic stimulus
package, a form of government intervention, adversely affects the efficiency of banking
sector which sufficiently eliminates the ameliorating effect of corruption on efficiency.
Table 8. The effect of bank connection, corruption on collateral during economic stimulus package
Dependent variable is the collateral
Bank
-0.03***(-2.76)
-0.10**(-2.47)
Bank*ESP
-0.04*(-1.89)
-0.08***(-2.85)
ESP
-0.02*(-1.92)
-0.02*(-1.80)
Corruption
-0.16(-0.62)
Bank*Corruption
-6.65***(-4.19)
Bank*Corruption*ESP
4.70***(2.77)
Firm size
-0.06***(-3.49)
-0.07***(-3.25)
Tangibility
-0.09***(-5.09)
-0.09***(-4.94)
Sales growth
-0.01**(-2.04)
-0.01**(-2.15)
Leverage
0.32***(7.76)
0.32***(7.99)
Debt structure
0.53***(10.60)
0.52***(10.58)
Cost of debt
-0.03***(-4.97)
-0.03***(-4.93)
Guarantee
-0.23***(-11.28)
-0.23***(-11.17)
CF volatility
-0.67***(-3.50)
-0.63***(-3.35)
ROA
-0.06(-0.59)
-0.08(-0.87)
Board size
-0.02(-0.63)
-0.02(-0.50)
Independent director
-0.06(-0.39)
-0.02(-0.15)
Prime rate
-0.10***(-7.10)
-0.10***(-7.12)
Constant
0.56**(2.15)
0.58**(2.29)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.34
0.35
Observations
1,973
1,973
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Dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. ESP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for post-ESP
period and 0 for pre-ESP period. Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 3.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and is
clustered by firm.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

4.7 Additional tests
4.7.1 Bank lending efficiency
In this section, we conduct additional tests to examine how bank connections and
corruption affect bank lending efficiency. From the previous analysis, we conclude that bank
connections and corruption together help firms seek rents from the banking sector in the form
of lower collateral requirements. However, whether the existence of bank connections and
corruption can improve bank lending efficiency remains unanswered. Thus, in this section,
we follow the spirit of Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013) to examine the effect of bank
connections and corruption on lending efficiency, where efficient bank lending is reflected by
a positive relation between bank loan and firm profitability (Firth et al., 2009). Empirically,
we estimate the following regression:

Finance   0  1 ROSit1   2 Bankit   3Corruptionit  4Ageit
  5 Sizeit   6 Employeeit   7 Indepit   8 Dualityit   it

(2)

where Finance is the proxy for bank financing. We apply Access to bank loan and Bank loan
size as the measurements in each respective regression. Access to bank loan is a dummy
variable if the firm has at least one loan from a bank, and Bank loan size is the ratio of
amount of bank loan to firm total assets. ROS is return on sales, calculated as the ratio of net
income to total sales; Age is the log of number of years of the firm since it has been
established; Employee is the log of number of employees; and Duality is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman on the board and 0 otherwise. All the other
variables are as defined in equation (1). We also include industry and year fixed effect in the
regression estimation. The results are reported in Table 9 below.
In Table 9, columns 1 to 3 report the results where we use Access to bank loan as the
dependent variable, while columns 4 to 6 report the results using Bank loan size as the
dependent variable. As can be seen from Table 9 across six specifications, the estimated
coefficients on ROS are all positive and statistically significant, indicating that on average
firm performance is a main determinant for a firm to get access to bank loans, and for lenders
being willing to extend credit to financially healthier firms, consistent with Firth et al. (2009).
The estimated results from using two alternative dependent variables are generally similar,
and some interesting evidence evolves. In particular, in column 2, we add Bank and
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Corruption, and interaction terms between them and ROS. The estimated coefficients on
Bank and Bank*ROS are both positive and significant at the 5% level (t-values are 2.45 and
2.19, respectively). These results suggest that firms’ bank connections help rent seeking when
the firms go to access the bank loans, and bank lending is more efficient in bank-connected
firms. When we turn to Corruption and Corruption*ROS, we also observe positive but
insignificant coefficients on these variables, indicating that bribery itself is not able to explain
access to bank loans and lending efficiency. In addition, in column 3, where we add the
interaction term between Bank, Corruption and ROS, the significant and positive coefficient
on Bank*Corruption*ROS reveals that bank-connected firms that devote more to bribery are
more likely to be favoured by lenders and have a higher probability of obtaining bank loans.
When we use Bank loan size as the dependent variable, the estimated results from columns 4
to 6 are similar to those in columns 1 to 3. As for the other control variables, we obtain the
expected coefficients consistent with earlier studies (Chen et al., 2013). Our additional test
results on bank lending efficiency suggest that capital allocation is efficient to some extent
for the private sector, while bank connections, and corruption through bank connections, can
improve lending efficiency, reflected by a stronger relationship between bank loans and firm
profitability. Overall, our findings corroborate studies by Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al.
(2013) and propose an explanation for the coexistence of a vibrant non-state sector and a
weak legal system. We further argue that in an emerging market where private-sector firms
experience political and financial discriminations in securing external financing, bank
connections and corruption facilitate rent seeking and are more likely to improve bank
lending efficiency and private sector growth.
Table 9. Regression between bank connection, corruption and bank loan financing
Dependent variable
Access to bank loan
Bank loan size
ROS
0.46***
0.46***
0.36***
0.26***
0.16***
(5.73)
(5.70)
(4.30)
(4.01)
(4.71)
Bank
0.43**
0.63**
0.02***
(2.45)
(2.25)
(3.13)
Bank*ROS
0.33**
0.25**
0.50**
(2.19)
(2.12)
(2.30)
Corruption
1.44
0.83
0.10
(0.76)
(0.50)
(1.02)
Corruption*ROS
0.05*
0.02
0.06*
(1.83)
(1.18)
(1.93)
Bank*Corruption*ROS
1.97**
(2.42)
Age
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
(-0.35)
(-0.36)
(-0.39)
(-0.75)
(-0.92)
Size
0.50***
0.49***
0.49***
0.02***
0.02***
(3.86)
(3.83)
(3.82)
(3.06)
(4.64)
Employee
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.01
0.01
(1.75)
(1.75)
(1.71)
(0.38)
(0.20)

0.16***
(4.73)
0.03***
(4.12)
0.42**
(2.21)
0.05
(0.45)
0.03
(1.21)
1.38***
(2.67)
-0.01
(-0.89)
0.02***
(4.43)
0.01
(0.28)
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Indep

2.46
2.47
2.36
0.08
0.10**
0.10*
(1.48)
(1.49)
(1.42)
(1.21)
(1.98)
(1.83)
Duality
0.10
0.09
0.06
0.01
0.01***
0.01***
(0.79)
(0.77)
(0.45)
(1.39)
(3.07)
(3.14)
Constant
6.69**
6.60**
6.75**
-0.14
-0.11*
-0.11*
(2.49)
(2.46)
(2.52)
(-1.36)
(-1.76)
(-1.64)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.17
0.22
0.23
Observations
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
1,973
Access to bank loan is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at least one bank loan. Bank loan size is the
ratio of amount of bank loans to firm total assets. ROS is return on sales. Age is the log of number of years since
firm establishment. Employee is the log of number of employees. Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
CEO is also the Chairman on the board. Definitions of all the other variables are as in Table 3.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and
are clustered by firm.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.7.1 Endogeneity issue
One potential concern we have with our previous results on the association between bank
connection and collateral is the endogeneity of bank connection, which has been noted by
most previous studies, though our results are not identical (i.e. Chen et al., 2011b). On one
hand, some bank officials might have resigned their original positions and sought posts in
better-performing entrepreneurial firms for their monetary and reputational concerns. On the
other hand, the top executives in firms with better firm performance have a higher probability
of being nominated as members of government entities. Here, bank connection may be
endogenously determined by some of the firm-specific characteristics in our regression. We
attempt to address the endogeneity issue by applying a natural experimental method where
we use the economic stimulus package as the exogenous policy variable where the bank
connection is mostly frozen. None of the entrepreneurial firms could forecast the
announcement of the economic stimulus package, and there was not enough time for nonbank-connected firms to appoint a bank-connected executive or an independent director to
seek rents from the government and share the capital allocation from the economic stimulus
package. In fact, we check the appointment of a new executive or independent director three
months before the announcement of ESP, and we do not that find any of these cases involves
the appointment of a bank-connected executive or independent director. In other words, the
economic stimulus package is an exogenous shock with respect to individual firms.
Empirically, we again use the ESP dummy variable, which equals 1 for firm-year
observations falling in the period after the economic stimulus package and 0 otherwise. We
run the same regression reported in Table 8 but using our new sample by including the firm-
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year observations falling in the year before and the year of the announcement. The sample
size is now reduced from 1,973 to 909.
The results, reported in Table 10, are consistent with our earlier analyses and support the
view that bank connection is negatively related to collateral, and corruption works in bankconnected firms. In particular, the estimated coefficients on bank connection, ESP dummy,
Bank*ESP, and Bank*Corruption are consistently negative, and significantly related to
collateral. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of Bank*ESP*Corruption is positive,
indicating that government intervention impedes the efficiency of the banking sector, and the
corruption effect has been reduced.
Table 10. The effect of bank connection and corruption on collateral during the economic stimulus
package: Natural experiment
The dependent variable is collateral
Bank
-0.06**(-2.26)
-0.11**(-2.48)
Bank*ESP
-0.07**(-2.55)
-0.10***(-2.85)
ESP
-0.03*(-1.86)
-0.02*(-1.86)
Corruption
-0.03(-0.24)
Bank*Corruption
-6.09***(-3.48)
Bank*Corruption*ESP
4.09**(1.98)
Firm size
-0.08***(-3.04)
-0.07***(-2.79)
Tangibility
-0.09***(-4.02)
-0.09***(-3.87)
Sales growth
0.01(0.85)
0.00(0.86)
Leverage
0.32***(5.41)
0.32***(5.42)
Debt structure
0.51***(7.13)
0.51***(7.12)
Cost of debt
-0.04***(-3.99)
-0.04***(-3.90)
Guarantee
-0.25***(-10.05)
-0.25***(-9.85)
CF volatility
-0.77***(-3.65)
-0.73***(-3.47)
ROA
-0.13(-0.89)
-0.17(-1.17)
Board size
-0.02(-0.43)
-0.01(-0.28)
Independent director
0.03(0.13)
0.07(0.37)
Prime rate
-0.07***(-3.48)
-0.08***(-3.45)
Constant
-0.07(-0.20)
-0.03(-0.10)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.34
0.35
Observations
909
909
The dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. Definitions of all the other variables are as in
Table 8.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and
are clustered by firm.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

In addition, we also try to address this endogeneity issue by using the propensitymatching method. By taking the bank-connected firms as our treatment sample, we construct
a control sample. A potential match in the control sample is any firm-year observation not
identified as bank-connected from the same industry as the connected firm. From the set of
potential matches we select a firm-year observation with the same market capitalization as
each observation from the treatment sample or, if no such match exists, a firm that is the
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closest, with no more than a 2% deviation. If still no match exists, the firm is dropped from
the matching process. This procedure results in a matched sample of 478 firm pairs where the
treatment and control samples have the same propensity to build bank connections. We then
run the same regression as in Table 8, using this newly constructed sample. Consistent with
our regression tests in section 4.3 with different samples, we repeat the propensity-matching
method to control for the endogeneity issue. The unreported results, broadly similar to those
using the full sample, are not reported here.
4.7.2 Other tests
Our analysis naturally relates to political connection, which has been examined
extensively (Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Bliss and Gul, 2012). These
studies provide evidence for the link between political connection and the terms of loan
contracts. For example, using a thousand firms in 47 countries, Faccio (2010) points out that
politically connected firms are more levered and face a lower cost of debt financing than nonpolitically connected firms, and Qi et al. (2010) echo that politically connected firms are
regarded as a lower level of risk, which relates to a higher bond rating and lower cost of
borrowing. Therefore, we are concerned whether our findings about the bank-connection
effect will be overridden by the effects of political connection. To address this issue, we
identify politically connected firms, based on a definition derived from Fan et al. (2007) and
Faccio (2010). In particular, a firm is defined as politically connected if the Chairman of the
board, CEO, largest shareholder or other top executives is a member of any of governmentrelated entities (such as the NPC, CPPCC etc.). Empirically, we create a dummy variable,
Political, equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected and 0 otherwise. For the regression
analysis, we add Political and respective interaction terms in each equation. The general
results show that political connection has a weaker effect in reducing collateral than bank
connection does. Some of the firm-year observations may have both bank connection and
political connection, so we repeat our regression analysis by excluding these observations to
avoid the overlapping effects; this repetition yields results that are relatively consistent with
those obtained earlier.
In addition, and consistent with the findings of Claessens et al., (2002) and Lemmon and
Lins (2003), excess control rights entrench large shareholders, while cash-flow rights give
them an incentive to exercise effective monitoring. Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et
al. (2011) provide supporting evidence that divergence between control rights and cash-flow
rights is positively related to cost of borrowing, while cash-flow rights are negatively related
to cost of borrowing. To supplement the effect of largest-shareholder ownership, and to check
30

the validity of our results, we repeat our regression analysis by adding a control-ownership
wedge in each regression and interact with the Bank connection dummy variable. The
untabulated results show a negative coefficient on the interaction between control-ownership
wedge and bank connection, and a positive coefficient for control-ownership wedge; both are
statistically significant. These results suggest that bank connection still matters after
considering the excess control rights of the largest shareholders. To supplement the incentive
effect of cash-flow rights, we repeat the above analysis by replacing the control-ownership
wedge with cash-flow rights; we find that the estimated coefficient on cash-flow rights and
bank-connection interaction is negative and statistically significant.
We further check the robustness of our results by applying alternative measures of
collateral. For example, we follow Cull and Xu (2005), Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010)
and Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) and use the natural log of collateralized loans and the
ratio of the sum of plant, property, equipment and inventory to total assets, and use the
collateral dummy as an alternative proxy for collateral. Overall, our results from the
multivariate regression using these alternative measures of collateral indicate that bank
connection is significantly negatively related to the requirement for collateral, which
facilitates corruption in the context of China.

5. Conclusion
The objective of this study is to examine the financial and economic implications of
bank connections and corruption on collateral requirements. We use data from China’s listed
firms and bank connections as proxy for the rent seeking by firms, and find that bank
connection relates to a lower collateral requirement. Our results are a supplement to the fact
that favoured loan terms can be granted through political connections, which encourages rent
seeking from banks.
We also find that collateral is negatively related to corruption, and that this association is
more pronounced if a firm is connected with the banks through its top executives, large
shareholders or independent board members. These bank connections have more impact than
general political connections in terms of reducing collateral and facilitating corruption. In
particular, we document that executive bank connections matter more than independentdirector bank connections. We further find that the economic stimulus package reduces the
compensation required by creditors on funds lending in the form of lower pledged collateral,
and further weakens the negative relation between bank connection and collateral. Moreover,
we also provide evidence that a negative relationship between corruption and collateral is
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weakened by the economic stimulus package. Our results in considering the endogeneity
issue are robust, since we have applied both a natural experimental method and a propensitymatching method. Various aspects of the test specification have also been changed, and
alternative measures of connection and collateral have been applied.
Overall, we argue that in an emerging market, where the financial and legal system is
underdeveloped, legal protection for creditors and investors is weak and institutionally
created rent opportunity is prevalent, bank connections can be a substitute for legal protection
to seek rents from banks, and corruption is effective in improving banking efficiency and
helping the non-state sector seek rents. Our findings confirm the value of political
connections in emerging markets.
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